书名：A Treatise of Human Nature 人性论
作者：David Hume
出版社名称：Penguin Classics
出版时间：1985
语种：英文 
ISBN：9780140432442
商品尺寸：13 x 3.3 x 19.8 cm
包装：平装
页数：688

A Treatise of Human Nature《人性论》是18世纪英国著名哲学家、历史学家、经济学家休谟一生中重要的著作。它通过不同学科分别对人的知性、情感和社会性等不同方面进行了研究，对人类思想史具有独创性的理论贡献。休谟总结了自笛卡儿以来近代西方哲学的成果，直接推动了康德批判哲学的形成。

休谟的哲学在西方哲学史上占有十分重要的地位，它不但是西方哲学史发展过程中的一个重要环节，起着承上启下的作用，而且以其深刻的思想和丰富的内涵极大地影响着现代西方哲学的发展，是许多哲学思潮和观点的理论来源。
在阅渎休谟的《人性论》时，我才感觉到了功利主义的强烈说服力，仿佛“道德的天平从眼前落下”。——杰里米·边沁

One of the most significant works of Western philosophy, Hume's Treatise was published in 1739-40, before he was thirty years old. A pinnacle of English empiricism, it is a comprehensive attempt to apply scientific methods of observation to a study of human nature, and a vigorous attack upon the principles of traditional metaphysical thought. With masterly eloquence, Hume denies the immortality of the soul and the reality of space; considers the manner in which we form concepts of identity, cause and effect; and speculates upon the nature of freedom, virtue and emotion. Opposed both to metaphysics and to rationalism, Hume's philosophy of informed scepticism sees man not as a religious creation, nor as a machine, but as a creature dominated by sentiment, passion and appetite.

A Treatise of Human Nature《人性论》全书分三卷，分别为“论知性”“论情感”和“论道德”。在本书中，休谟试图通过对人性的研究来揭示制约人的理智、情感和道德行为的准则。作者认为一切科学都与人性有关，对人性的研究应是一切科学的基础。

大卫·休谟（David Hume，1711年4月26日-1776年8月25日），苏格兰哲学家，出生于爱丁堡，与约翰·洛克及贝克莱并称三大英国经验主义者。其特点在于重视从“生活经验”中提炼出哲学观点，如“知识来源于印象而非理性”，认为没有事实可由先验（a priori）方法被证明。休谟的主要著作有《人性论》、《道德和政治论说文集》、《人类理解研究》、《道德原理探究》、《宗教的自然史》、《自然宗教对话录》、《自凯撒入侵至1688年革命的英国史》（6卷）等。
DavidHume (1711-76) devoted himself from early youth to 'philosophy and great learning'. A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) was not well received on publication, but is now viewed as his masterpiece.

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The Contents
Introduction
Book I: Of The Understanding
Book II: Of The Passions
Book III: Of Morals

ALL the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEA s. The difference betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only, those which arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees of these are easily distinguished; tho’ it is not impossible but in particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul, our ideas may approach to our impressions: As on the other hand it sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But notwithstanding this near resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different, that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference.
There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be convenient to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas. This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into parts. Tho’ a particular colour, taste, and smell are qualities all united together in this apple, ‘tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.
Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects, we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their qualities and relations. The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one seem to be in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions of the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas. When I shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation. Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. This circumstance seems to me remarkable, and engages my attention for a moment.