书名：The Federalist Papers 联邦党人文集

作者：Alexander Hamilton亚历山大·汉密尔顿;James Madison詹姆斯·麦迪逊

出版社名称: Signet Classics

出版时间：2003

语种：英文

ISBN: 9780451528810

商品尺寸: 10.6 x 2.7 x 17.5 cm

包装：简装

页数: 688 （以实物为准）

"This country and this people seem to have been made for each other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren ... should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties." So wrote John Jay, one of the revolutionary authors of The Federalist Papers, arguing that if the United States was truly to be a single nation, its leaders would have to agree on universally binding rules of governance--in short, a constitution. In a brilliant set of essays, Jay and his colleagues Alexander Hamilton and James Madison explored in minute detail the implications of establishing a kind of rule that would engage as many citizens as possible and that would include a system of checks and balances. Their arguments proved successful in the end, and The Federalist Papers stand as key documents in the founding of the United States. 

The documents thatshaped a nation.  

Three of the founding fathers brilliantly defend their revolutionary charter: the Constitution of the United States, a milestone in political science and a classic of American history.

《聯邦黨人文集》三位作者都是美國建國初期起過不同作用的資産階級曆史人物。他們當時自稱聯邦共和國制度。因此，《聯邦黨人文集》是全面爲新憲法辯護的壹部著作。對目前聯邦政府的無能有了無可置疑的經驗以後，要請妳們爲美利堅合衆國慎重考慮壹部新的憲法。這個問題本身就能說明它的重要性；因爲它的後果涉及聯邦的生存、聯邦各組成部分的安全與福利，以及壹個在許多方面可以說是世界上最引人注意的帝國的命運。時常有人指出，似乎有下面的重要問題留待我國人民用他們的行爲和範例來求得解決：人類社會是否真正能夠通過深思熟慮和自由選擇來建立壹個良好的政府，還是他們永遠注定要靠機遇和強力來決定他們的政治組織。如果這句話不無道理，那末我們也許可以理所當然地把我們所面臨的緊要關頭當做是應該作出這項決定的時刻；由此看來，假使我們選錯自己將要扮演的角色，那就應當認爲是全人類的不幸。

這個想法會在愛國心的動機之外又增加關懷人類的動機，以提高所有思慮周到的善良人士對這事件的關切心情。如果我們的選擇取決于對我們真正利益的明智估計，而不受與公共利益無關的事實的迷惑和影響，那就萬分幸運了。但這件事情與其說是可以認真預期，還不如說是只能熱切希望而已。提供給我們審議的那個計劃，要影響太多的私人利益，要改革太多的地方機構，因此在討論中必然會涉及與計劃的是非曲直無關的各種事物，並且激起對尋求真理不利的觀點、情感和偏見。

在新憲法必然會碰到的最大障礙中，可以很容易地發現下列情況：每壹州都有某壹類的人，他們的明顯利益在于反對壹切變化，因爲那些變化有可能減少他們在州政府中所任職位的權力、待遇和地位；另外還有壹類人，他們出于不正常的野心，或者希望趁國家混亂的機會擴大自己的權力，或者認爲，對他們來說在國家分爲幾個部分邦聯政府的情況下，要比聯合在壹起有更多向上爬的機會。Alexander Hamilton was born in the West Indies in 1757, the illegitimate child of a Scottish merchant. He came to the American colonies to study at King’s College (now Columbia University), and became an early and ardent supporter of the Revolutionary cause. During the Revolutionary War he was aide-de-camp to George Washington and a member of the Continental Congress. He was a leading figure at the Constitutional Convention (1787) and a principal author of The Federalist Papers. At first Secretary of the Treasury he articulated a policy of protection for manufacturing interests, strong central government, and establishment of a national bank. After leaving the Cabinet, he practiced law in New York. His personal attacks hindered the political career of the volatile Aaron Burr, who finally challenged him to a duel in 1804. Hamilton was shot, and died of his wounds.

James Madison was born in 1751, the son of a Virginia planter. He worked for the Revolutionary cause as a member of the Continental Congress and the Virginia House of Delegates. The leader of deliberations at the Constitutional Convention, he fought for the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Through an ally of Hamilton on the Constitution he was a supporter of Jefferson’s agrarian policies. He was Jefferson’s Secretary of State (1801-9) and his successor as president (1809-17), but his presidency was marred by the unpopular War of 1812. Madison died in 1836.

The Federalist No. 1: Hamilton

October 27, 1787

To the People of the State of New York.

After an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the subsisting Federal Government, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences, nothing less than the existence of the Union, the safety and welfare of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire, in many respects, the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked, that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not, of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis, at which we are arrived, may with propriety be regarded as the æra in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act, may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.

This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism to heighten the solicitude, which all considerate and good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiassed by considerations not connected with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations, affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little favourable to the discovery of truth.

Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter, may readily be distinguished the obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument and consequence of the offices they hold under the State-establishments-and the perverted ambition of another class of men, who will either hope to aggrandise themselves by the confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies, than from its union under one government.

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views: Candour will oblige us to admit, that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable, the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so powerful are the causes, which serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the wrong as well as on the right side of questions, of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a lesson of moderation to those, who are ever so much persuaded of their being in the right, in any controversy. And a further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the reflection, that we are not always sure, that those who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many other motives, not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as upon those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, nothing could be more illjudged than that intolerant spirit, which has, at all times, characterised political parties. For, in politics as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution.