书名：Critique of Pure Reason纯粹理性批判
作者：Immanuel Kant
出版社名称：Penguin Classics
出版时间：2008
语种：英文
ISBN：9780140447477
商品尺寸：13 x 3.6 x 19.8 cm
包装：平装
页数：784
Critique of Pure Reason《纯粹理性批判》是康德三大批判著作、也是其全部哲学著述中意义极为特殊和重大的巨著，它改变了整个西方哲学前进发展的方向和进程。康德花了11年的时间完成。贯彻始终的根本指导思想就是：通过对理性本身、即人类先天认识能力的批判考察，确定它有哪些先天的、即具有普遍性和必然性的要素，以及这些要素的来源、功能、条件、范围和界限，从而确定它能认识什么和不能认识什么，在这基础上对形而上学的命运和前途作出的判决和规定，其使命是为真正的、作为科学的形而上学提供坚实可靠的基础。
《纯粹理性批判》是欧洲哲学史上一部具有转折意义的重要著作。
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant laid out a framework upon which the whole of modern philosophy is based. This Penguin Classics edition is translated from the German and edited with an introduction by Marcus Weigelt, based on the translation by Max Muller.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It presents a profound and challenging investigation into the nature of human reason, its knowledge and illusions. Reason, Kant argues, is the seat of certain concepts that precede experience and make it possible, but we are not therefore entitled to draw conclusions about the natural world from these concepts. The Critique brings together the two opposing schools of philosophy: rationalism, which grounds all our knowledge in reason, and empiricism, which traces all our knowledge to experience. Kant's transcendental idealism indicates a third way that goes far beyond these alternatives.
Marcus Weigelt's lucid re-working of Max Muller's classic translation makes the Critique accessible to a new generation of readers. His informative introduction places the work in context and elucidates Kant's main arguments. This edition also contains a bibliography and explanatory notes.
Critique of Pure Reason《纯粹理性批判》被公认为是德国哲学家康德流传极为广泛，极具影响力的著作，同时也是整个西方哲学史上极其重要和影响极其深远的著作之一。这部著作常被称做康德的“第1批判”，并与其后的《实践理性批判》和《判断力批判》并称为康德“三大批判”。在这部西方哲学奠基式的著作中，康德尝试将理性主义和经验主义接合起来，并以此反对大卫·休谟彻底的经验主义。
伊曼努尔•康德，著名德意志哲学家，德国古典哲学创始人，其学说深深影响了近代西方哲学，并开启了德国唯心主义和康德主义等诸多流派。康德是启蒙运动时期zui后一位主要哲学家，是德国思想界的代表人物。康德有其自成一派的思想系统，代表作有《纯粹理性批判》《实践理性批判》和《判断力批判》。

Immanuel Kant(1724-1804) was one of the most influential philosophers of all time. His comprehensive and profound thinking on aesthetics, ethics, and knowledge has had an immense impact on all subsequent philosophy.
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience. For how should the faculty of knowledge be called into activity if not by objects which affect our senses, and which partly produce representations by themselves, partly rouse the activity of our understanding to compare, to connect or to separate these representations, and thus to convert the raw material of our sensible impressions into a knowledge of objects which we call experience. With respect to time, therefore, no knowledge within us is antecedent to experience, and all knowledge begins with experience.
But although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience. For it is quite possible that even our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and of that which our own faculty of knowledge (sensible impressions merely prompting it to do so) supplies from itself, an addition which we do not distinguish from that raw material until long practice has I made us attentive to it and rendered us capable of separating one from the other.
It is therefore a question which at least deserves closer investigation, and one that cannot be disposed of at first sight, namely, whether there exists a knowledge that is independent of experience and even of all impressions of the senses. Such knowledge is called a priori, and it is distinguished from empirical knowledge, which has its sources a posteriori, that is, in experience.
This term ‘a priori’, however, is not yet determinate enough to indicate the full meaning of our question. For it is customary to say, even with regard to some knowledge derived from empirical sources, that we have it or might partake of it a priori, because we do not derive it immediately from experience, but from a general rule, a rule which is itself, however, borrowed by us from experience. Thus one would say of a person who undermined the foundations of his house that he might have known a priori that it would tumble down, that is, that he need not have waited for the experience of its actually tumbling down. But still he could not know this entirely a priori. For he had first to learn from experience that bodies are heavy, and will fall when their supports are taken away.
In what follows, therefore, we shall understand by a priori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience. Opposed to it is empirical knowledge, which is possible only a posteriori, that is, through experience. A priori knowledge is called pure if nothing empirical is mixed in with it. Thus the proposition, for example, every alteration has its cause, is an a priori proposition; yet it is not pure, because alteration is a concept which can be derived only from experience.