书名：Fundamentals of Queueing-Game Models（排队博弈模型基础）
定价：168.0
ISBN：9787030836366
作者：王金亭
版次：1
出版时间：2026-01

内容提要：

无

目录：
Contents
1 Preliminaries 1
1.1 Basics from Game Theory 1
1.1.1 Definition of Game 1
1.1.2 Non-cooperative Game 3
1.1.3 Nash Equilibrium 4
1.1.4 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies 5
1.1.5 Follow the Crowd and Avoid the Crowd 5
1.2 Basics from Queueing Theory 5
1.2.1 Basics of Queueing Systems 6
1.2.2 Notations for Classic Queueing Systems 7
1.2.3 Main Measures of Queueing Systems 8
1.2.4 M/M/1 Queueing Systems 9
1.2.5 M/M/1/K Model: System with Limited Waiting Space 10
1.2.6 Little's Law 12
1.2.7 PASTA: Poisson Arrivals See Time Averages 13
1.3 Basic Concepts for Queueing Game Models 14
1.3.1 Costs and Objective Functions 14
1.3.2 Information of System 15
1.3.3 Threshold Strategies 15
1.3.4 Price of Anarchy 16
References 17
2 Observable Queueing Systems 19
2.1 M/M/1 Queueing Systems 21
2.1.1 Model Description 21
2.1.2 Individually Optimal Strategy 22
2.1.3 Socially-Optimal Strategy 22
2.1.4 Admission Revenue Maximization Strategy 24
2.2 M/G/1 Queues 24
2.2.1 Model Description 24
2.2.2 Equilibrium Strategy 25
2.3 GI/M/c Queueing Systems 27
2.3.1 Model Description 27
2.3.2 Individually Optimal Strategy 29
2.3.3 Socially Optimal Strategy 31
References 34
3 Unobservable Queueing Systems 37
3.1 The M/M/1 Queueing System 38
3.1.1 Model Description 38
3.1.2 Nash Equilibrium Strategy 38
3.1.3 Social Optimization 39
3.1.4 Profit Maximization Strategy 40
3.2 M/G/1 Queues 40
3.2.1 Model Description 40
3.2.2 Nash Equilibrium Strategy 40
3.2.3 Socially Optimal Strategy 41
3.2.4 Revenue Maximization Strategy 42
3.3 GI/M/c Queueing System 42
3.3.1 Model Description 42
3.3.2 Queue Length Distribution Derivation Using Arrival Times 43
3.3.3 Equilibrium Balking Strategy 46
References 47
4 Optimal Disclosure of Information 49
4.1 Preliminaries 51
4.2 Throughout-Maximizing Policy 53
4.3 Socially Optimal Policy 56
4.4 Robustness of Findings 64
4.4.1 Alternative Objective of Social Welfare 66
4.4.2 Other Service Time Distributions 66
4.4.3 Unknown Arrival Rate and Service Rate Information 68
4.4.4 Customer Heterogeneity with Different Service Rewards 71
4.4.5 Presence of Experienced Customers 72
References 77
5 Risk-Sensitive Queueing Game 79
5.1 Preliminaries 81
5.2 Model and Analysis 82
5.3 Effects of Queue Length Information 99
5.3.1 Customer Joining Strategies with Queue Length Information 99
5.3.2 Numerical Illustrations 105
5.4 Concluding Remarks 106
References 107
6 Queueing Games with Priority 109
6.1 M/M/1 Queueing Systems with Priority 110
6.1.1 Model Description 110
6.1.2 Equilibrium Strategy in Observable Queue 111
6.1.3 Equilibrium Strategy in Unobservable Queue 113
6.2 M/M/1 Queues with Priority and Processor Sharing 114
6.2.1 Model Description 114
6.2.2 Equilibrium Payment Strategy 115
6.3 M/M/1 Queueing Systems with Priority and Random Service 117
6.3.1 Model Description 117
6.3.2 Equilibrium Payment Strategy 117
6.4 M/M/1 Queueing Systems with Priority and Balking 119
6.4.1 Related Literatures 123
6.4.2 The Unobservable Model 124
6.4.3 The Observable Model 131
6.4.4 Numerical Experiments 141
6.4.5 Concluding Remarks 149
References 150
7 Repairable Queueing Systems 153
7.1 M/M/1 Repairable Queueing Systems 154
7.1.1 Model Description 154
7.1.2 Equilibrium Threshold Strategies for the Fully Observable Case 155
7.1.3 Equilibrium Strategies for the Almost Observable Case 156
7.1.4 Equilibrium Strategies for the Almost Unobservable Case 159
7.1.5 Equilibrium Strategy for the Fully Unobservable Case 162
7.2 M/M/1 Queueing Systems with Disaster 164
7.2.1 Model Description 164
7.2.2 Joining Strategy Analysis in Observable Case 165
7.2.3 Joining Strategy Analysis in Unobservable Case 168
References 173
8 Vacation Queueing Systems 175
8.1 M/M/1 Vacation Queueing Systems with Setup Periods 176
8.1.1 Model Description 176
8.1.2 Equilibrium Threshold Strategies in the Fully Observable Case 177
8.1.3 Equilibrium Threshold Strategies in the Almost Unobservable Case 178
8.1.4 Equilibrium Mixed Strategies for the Almost Unobservable Case 181
8.1.5 Equilibrium Threshold Strategies in the Fully Unobservable Case 184
8.2 M/M/1 Queueing Systems with Working Vacation 185
8.2.1 Model Description 185
8.2.2 Equilibrium Strategies for the Fully Observable Case 185
8.2.3 Equilibrium Strategies for the Almost Observable Case 187
8.2.4 Equilibrium Strategies for the Almost Unobservable Case 191
8.2.5 Equilibrium Strategies for the Fully Unobservable Case 196
8.3 M/M/1 Queueing System with N-Policy 199
8.3.1 Model Description 199
8.3.2 Equilibrium Strategies for the Fully Observable Case 199
8.3.3 Equilibrium Strategies for the Almost Observable Case 204
8.3.4 Equilibrium Strategies for the Almost Unobservable Case 206
8.3.5 Equilibrium Strategies for the Fully Unobservable Case 211
8.4 M/G/1 Queues with Multiple Vacations 215
8.4.1 Model Description 215
8.4.2 Equilibrium Analysis of Joining Strategies in the Fully Unobservable Case 215
8.4.3 Equilibrium Analysis of Joining Strategies in the Almost Unobservable Case 217
References 227
9 Retrial Queueing Systems 229
9.1 M/M/1 Retrial Queues 230
9.1.1 Model Description 230
9.1.2 Retrial Strategy Analysis 232
9.1.3 Equilibrium Strategy in Unobservable Retrial Queue 236
9.1.4 Equilibrium Strategy in Observable Retrial Queue 241
9.2 The M/M/1 Constant Retrial Queue 248
9.2.1 Model Description 248
9.2.2 Equilibrium Strategy in Unobservable Retrial Queue 249
9.2.3 Equilibrium Strategy in Observable Retrial Queue 254
References 259
10 Applications in Wireless Communication Systems 261
10.1 LAN Application with Delayed Vacation 262
10.1.1 Model Description 263
10.1.2 Nash Equilibrium Strategy 267
10.1.3 Server's Revenue Maximization Problem 268
10.1.4 Socially Optimal Strategy 271
10.1.5 Numerical Examples 273
10.2 Application: Cognitive Radio Networks 278
10.2.1 Problem Formulation 279
10.2.2 Non-cooperative Solution 283
10.2.3 Cooperative Solution 285
10.2.4 Admission Fee 288
10.3 Summary 291
References 292
11 Applications in Service-Inventory Systems 295
11.1 Model Description 297
11.2 Fully Unobservable Case 299
11.2.1 Individual Equilibrium Strategy 301
11.2.2 Revenue Maximization 302
11.2.3 Socially Optimal Strategy 304
11.3 Partially Observable Case 305
11.3.1 Individual Equilibrium Strategy 305
11.3.2 Socially Optimal Strategy 308
11.4 Numerical Experiments 310
11.5 Discussions 315
11.6 Optimal Inventory Threshold for a Make-to-Stock System 316
11.6.1 Model Description 320
11.6.2 Main Results 321
11.6.3 Observable Inventory Case 321
11.6.4 Unobservable Inventory Case 330
11.7 Numerical Experiments 335
11.8 Conclusions 339
11.9 Appendix 339
References 342
12 Healthcare Systems 347
12.1 Model Preliminaries 349
12.1.1 System Performance 351
12.1.2 Sensitivity Analysis 353
12.1.3 Numerical Examples 354
12.2 The Impact of Equilibrium Behavior 357
12.2.1 Numerical Examples 360
12.3 Extensions 362
12.3.1 Model with Three-Level System 362
12.3.2 Model with Multiple L-Hospitals 368
12.4 Concluding Remarks 370
12.5 Appendix: Technical Proofs 371
References 380
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